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Abstract
Solid State Drives offer significant advantages over traditional hard disk drives. No moving parts,
superior resistance to shock, reduced heat generation and increased battery life for laptops.
However,theyaresusceptibletocellfailurewithinthechips.Tocounterthis,wearlevellingisusedso
thatcellsareutilisedfordataatapproximatelythesamerate.Animprovementtotheoriginalwear
levelling routine is TRIM, which further enhances the lifetime of the cells by allowing the garbage
collectionprocessasoneoperationratherthananongoingprocess.TheadvantagesofTRIMforthe
user is that it increases efficiency of the drive’s wear levelling algorithms, meaning quicker access
times and longer lifetimes. The basic wear levelling routines have caused significant difficulties for
forensicinvestigatorsasdataismovedtodifferentrandomlocationswithoutuserinput.Whilstthis
problem has been examined in past research, the implementation of TRIM has not had much
attention.ThisresearchexaminesSSDdrivesacrossthreeTRIMenabledfilesystems,Windows,Linux
and MAC OS X operating systems. The results show that TRIM leaves far less data for forensic
investigatorsthandriveswithoutTRIMenabled.
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INTRODUCTION
SolidStatememoryhasbeenavailableinvariousformatsforalmostquarterofacentury.Withthe
recentreductionincostandincreaseinsize,SolidStateDrives(SSDs)arenowapopularchoicefor
laptopanddesktopcomputers.AdvantagesofSSDdrivesarelighterweight,fasteraccesstimesand
less heat generation. Coupled with significant resistance to damage from physical shock and low
powerusage,thismakesthemespeciallyattractiveforuseinlaptopcomputers.However,SSDsdeal
withdeletionofdatainaverydifferentmannerthantraditionalHardDiskDrives(HDDs).Generally
whendataisdeletedfromaharddrive,thedataisretaineduntilnewdataiswrittenontothesame
location.Ifnonewdataiswrittenoverthedeleteddata,thentheforensicinvestigatorcanrecover
thedeleteddata,albeitofteninfragments.Acomputerthathasbeenunusedforyearscanstillhave
data recovered from its hard drive (Moulton, 2008). To counter this, users may deliberately
overwritedeleteddatausingsoftwarethatwillwritezeroestothedeletedlocations.

SSDs suffer from wear on cells which significantly reduces the lifetime of the drive. If blocks on a
drivearecontinuouslywrittentoanderased,thenthedrivemaylosesignificantamountsofspace
duetofailureofindividualcellswhichmakestheentireblockofcellsunusable(Perdue,2008).To
counter this, SSDs perform wear levelling by taking data from a wellused block on the drive and
writingittoanunderusedblock.Whentheregular“GarbageCollection”isperformed,theoldarea
where the data was moved from is written with zeroes. This means that users do not need to
proactivelyzerodeletedatalocations,butratheritisdoneasamatterofcoursebythedrive.While
thisprolongsthelifetimeofthedrive,itsignificantlyreducesthedatathatcanberetrievedfromthe
drivebytheforensicinvestigator.Tofurtherincreasethelifetimeofthedrive,TRIMcanbeenabled
thatforcestheoperatingsystemtonotifythedrivethatdatahasbeendeletedfromalocationand
thedrivecanthenmarkitslocationasinvalid(Williams,2010).Thisoccursshortlyafterthedatais
deleted,and theSSDGarbageCollectionroutinewillnowskip thecollectionfromtheselocations,
savingwearonthedriveandspeedingupthegarbagecollectionprocess.
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The implementation of TRIM hands some power back to the operating system to determine how
deletionofdatawillbehandledbythedrive.Thisisbeneficialtotheforensicinvestigatorbecause
deleteddatawillremainonthedriveasinvaliddata,ratherthanwrittenoverbyzeroes.Theprocess
ofdatadeletiononSSDswasexaminedin2009todiscoverhowmuchdatawasretainedwhenthe
drive was wiped(Freeman and Woodward, 2009). In their research, a TRIM enabled drive was not
availableandsoTRIMwasnotexamined.Thisresearchtakesthisinvestigationfurtherandlooksat
the data retained by SSDs utilising the TRIM capability. Three file systems are investigated: NTFS,
Ext4andHFS+.

STATEOFTHEART
The design of an SSD is made up of nonvolatile NAND based flash memory chips which provide
sufficientdensity,quickeraccesstimeandreducedlatencyforuseasaprimarystoragedevice.Akey
component of an SSD is the controller which bridges the NAND memory components to a host
computer (Shimpi, 2009). The controller is a processer embedded in the drive that executes
firmwarelevelcodeandfunctions.Primarilythekeyfunctionsperformedbythecontrollerinclude
read and write caching, garbage collection and wear levelling(Rent, 2010). The makeup of NAND
flashchipsontheSSDconsistsofcells,pages,blocksandplanesdesignedinahierarchicalstructure
that have their own individual and unique physical properties and characteristics(Vidas and King,
2011). The standard page size on SSDs is 4KB and these pages are grouped together into blocks
which commonly consist of 128 pages per block. This results in a 512KB block. Many of the SSD’s
issuesstemfromthewaythedrivereadsandwrites.Asablockisthesmalleststructurethatcanbe
erasedinNANDflash,128pagesmustbeerasedinordertoeraseaparticularblock.SingleNAND
flashcellscancontaineitheroneortwobitsofdata,eitherSingleLevelCell(SLC)orMultiLevelCell
(MLC).BothSLCandMLCarephysicallyandfundamentallythesame,itisonlyhowdataisstored
andreadwhichseparatesthetwo(Moulton,2008).

SSDsaresusceptibletomuchshorterlifespansthentypicalHDDs.Thestandardlifeexpectancyofan
SSDisestimatedat5years,however,writinganderasingdataonSSDsresultsinweartotheflash
cells which limits the lifetime of the drive(Moulton, 2008). To prolong the drives longevity the
practice of wear levelling was introduced (Perdue, 2008). Wear levelling requires all cells on the
drive to be written to at least once before writing over the same cell again. As each cell has
limitationstothenumberofrewritesanderasuresbeforeitslifespandiminishes,typicallyaround
the3,000/5,000cyclefigure,spreadingtheerasureandwritesacrossallcellsensuresnosingleerase
blockislikelytoprematurelyfail.However,whenthedrivebecomesfull,speedcanbesignificantly
affected(Shimpi,2009).

Flash cells operate under a method of deletebeforewrite which requires a cell to be completely
erasedor zeroedoutbeforeafurther write canbe committed.Toalleviatetheimpact createdby
thetimeconsumingeraseoperation,thegarbagecollectionprocesswasintroduced(Shimpi,2009).
Garbage collection is a background operation that accumulates data blocks that have been
previouslymarkedfordeletion,performsawholeblockerasureoneach‘garbage’block,andreturns
the reclaimed space for subsequent rewrite operations. The garbage collection process is a
combination of algorithms designed to deal with performance degradation that occurs on these
drivesovertime(Williams,2010).Howevergarbagecollectionisprimarilyabackgroundprocessand
topreservedriveperformancewhileinoperationanadditionalsolutionwasrequiredandhencethe
introductionofTRIM(Mehling,2009).

The support of the TRIM instruction has been implemented in most contemporary operating
systems;NTFSonWindows7,Ext4usedwiththeLinuxKernelversion2.6.33orlater,andMacOSX
10.6.8 or later using HFS+. TRIM, as opposed to standard garbage collection, interacts with the
operatingsystemwhichmarkstheblocksasdeleted(Intel,2013).Thecontrolleronthedriveisstill
responsibleforwhengarbagecollectionisinitiatedbutTRIMaddressestheneedformore“scratch”
spacethroughasimplecommandsentwhenadeleteoperationisperformedwheretheOSsendsa
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TRIM command to the SSD with a list of the required blocks marked for deletion. When a file is
deleted, the operating system sends a trim command to the SSD controller. The block marked for
deletionisthencopiedtocache,thedeletedpagesarewipedandanewblockiswrittenwithnew
pages(Shimpi,2009).

WhileTRIMdoesnotalleviateallperformanceissues,theuseofTRIMhasproventobeasolutionto
helpmaintainanSSDshighperformanceevenwithheavyusage.Duetothedesignandtechnology
usedintraditionalHardDiskDrives,ithasbeenanarguablysimpleprocessinmanycasestoacquire
deleted data and provided a relatively easy avenue of investigation for Computer Forensic
Professionals.AsSSDsoperatedifferentlyfromthetraditionalHardDiskDrive,thishasresultedin
concern as to what the future is for the traditional tools and techniques for both the Computer
ForensicandDataRecoveryindustries(BellandBoddington,2010).

DATACOLLECTION
Theexperimentsfocusedaroundthreemaintestcases.Thesewerethethreefilesystem/operating
system platforms selected. All three platforms support and implement the TRIM instruction when
usedwithaTRIMsupportedSSD.Withineachtestcasemultipletestscenarioswerecreatedbased
onworkloadanddriveusage.IneachcombinationtestswererunwithTRIMenabledanddisabled.
The effectiveness of TRIM as an antiforensic tool to purge deleted data was also tested at the
devicelevelwhichiscoveredinourAntiForensicstestcase.

Afourthtestcase,theAntiForensicstestcasewasaddedtolookattheeffectivenessofTRIMinkey
areas.OnewastheeffectivenessofTRIMincombinationwiththetoolhdparmasanantiforensics
measureasoutlinedinVidasandKing’sresearch(VidasandKing,2011).Anotherwastoprovidea
device level picture of how TRIM is executed when the instruction is passed to the drive. The
experiment was designed to enable the system to provide data for both of these areas. These
experimentswereperformeddirectlyontheSandforceSSDwiththehelpoftheLinuxkernelandthe
hdparmanddcflddtools.Theexperimentalsetupeliminatedanydesignandimplementationchoices
aroundTRIMonvariousplatformsthatmaybeidentifiedinthethreeinitialtestcases.

Theobjectivesfortheexperimentswereasfollows:

TestSSDDataRetentiononNTFS,Ext4,andHFS+filesystemsunderthefollowingconditions:

x
Idleworkload
x
Activityworkload
x
Lowdriveusage
x
Highdriveusage
x
TRIMenabledanddisabled

TesttheeffectivenessofTRIMasanAntiForensicsmeasureunderthefollowingconditions:

x
ManualpassingoftheTRIMcommandatthedevicelevel

These test cases cover three file system / operating system platforms; NTFS on Windows 7 (SP1),
Ext4onUbuntu11.10usingkernelversion3.0.0,andHFS+onMacOSX10.7.Weusedthe64Bit
versionofeachoperating system. Theseoperatingsystemsallsupport theTRIMinstructionunder
certainconditions.Eachoperatingsystemisinstalledusingthedefaultsetupoptionsincludingthe
creationofpartitions.
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TESTING
Two scenarios were selected to provide two different workloads applied to the drives during the
tests.Thefirstwasanidleworkscenarioandconsistedofthetesttakingplacewiththeoperating
systemperformingnootherwork.Thesecondwasanactivitytestscenariowhichsimulatedasetof
userinitiated tasks and the use of software applications by a user. The idle workload involved
allowing the drive to sit powered on, with the operating system loaded but with no applications
runningbeyondthedefaultbackgroundprocesses.Itwaslefttositforonehourbeforeextraction
began.Theidleworkloadinourtestsisascloseaspossibletozerodriveactivitywithoutpowering
down.

Thestepsintheprocesswerethen:

1.
TheSSDwaswipedusingacustomdesignedtwophaseprocess.


ALinuxBashscriptwascreatedtoTRIMtheentiredriveresultinginanSSDwipe.


AsecondphaseinvolvedwritingaHEXpatternofzeros"00"totheentiredrive.

2.

TheSSDwasimagedwiththeplatformimageforthenexttestduetoberun.

3.

Thetestcomputerwasselected;eitherTestOne,TestTwo,orTestMacMini.

4.

TheSSDwasplacedinacaddytrayandinsertedintotheremovabledrivebay.

5.

DependingonthetestcomputerselectedtheBIOSsettingsonstartupweremanipulatedand
thisdisabledtheinternaldriveifonewaspresent.

6.

TheSSDwasthenbootedasnormal
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Figure1Processdiagramofplatformtestingprocess



The workload consisted of several common software applications scripted to perform a range of
differentactions.Thiswasdesignedtosimulateatypicaluserinitiatedworkloadonthedrive.VLC
Media Player, Mozilla Firefox, Mozilla Thunderbird and Libre Office were selected. These four
applications cover the typical tasks of a user including music and video playback, web browsing,
email and document creation. The activity workload was automated for one hour using custom
scripts.Aseparatescriptwascreatedtolooptheonehourworkloadasmanytimesaswasrequired
forlongertests.
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Figure2Activityworkloadscenarioprocess

Twousagescenarioswereselected.Lowdriveusagerepresentedadefaultinstalloftheoperating
systemandanyrequireddriversandupdates.Theonlyapplicationsinstalledwerethoserequiredfor
the"Activity"workscenarios.Thesecondscenariowashighdriveusage.Inthisscenariofreespace
was reduced to within 5%  10% of the total SSD size using dummy files. A run of the tests was
completed with TRIM disabled to provide a control set of data. In this NOTRIM scenario only the
SSDs native garbage collection routines and any operating system writes to the extraction areas
wereseen.TRIMeffectivenessitself,atthedeviceleveliscoveredintheAntiForensicstestcase.

ANTIFORENSICS
ThistestcaserepeatedtheexperimentconductedbyVidasandKing(2011).Theyfoundthatmanual
TRIM, using the software tool hdparm could be usedas an antiforensics measure(Vidas and King,
2011).ShuandObrpointoutthatsinceATA8supportsaTRIMofupto65,536blocks(@512Bytes
inasinglecommanditwouldbepossibletoTRIManentiredriveinseconds(ShuandObr,2007).The
drivewouldthenproceedtosanitizeitself,wipingalldata.

The experiment was recreated using the hdparm software tool and custom scripts. Two scenarios
were tested; a drive filled entirely with a repeating text pattern and a drive filled entirely with
random data. Due to the compression and deduplication features implemented within the
SandForcebasedSSDusedfortheexperiments,itwasimportanttotestusingadatasetthatwould
force the controller to write every Byte sent. This test scenario would fill the drive with randomly
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generated data before a whole drive TRIM was initiated. The drive was then analysed and the
amountofremainingdatacalculated.

RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
Theresultsfromthe3testrunswerethenexaminedtoidentifythepercentageofBytesretained.
Tables13comparetheretaineddataacrossthe3testscenarios.

Table1:Percentofpayloadbytesretainedafterinitialpayloaddeletion



Table2:Percentofpayloadbytesretained1hourafterpayloaddeletion



Table3:Percentofpayloadbytesretained5hoursafterdeletion



In tables 13, the difference in results with the combinations of platform test cases and test
scenarios that made up the experiments is clearly shown. Whilst NTFS had some previous testing,
verylittlefocushasbeenfocussedontheExt4andHFS+filesystems.Aprimaryobjectiveforthese
experiments was to see how much, if any, data would be retained on the file systems with TRIM
enabled/disabledrespectively.Afurtherresultofinterestwaswhethertimehadaneffectondata
retention when TRIM was enabled. It was found that this was not the case. The figures from the
extraction of data after the first hour mark show minimal change between that and the final
extractionafterthefivehourmark.Thisshowsthatregardlessoftheperiodoftimeadrivemaybe
activeoridle,oncethe TRIMcommandissenttothedrive,anyerasingusuallytakesplacewithin
minutes.

Thetestsusedfourdifferentpayloadtypes.Theseweretwosmallfiles,onebeingfilledwithrandom
data and another filled with a repeating string of text. The same was created for two larger sized
files.Aftertheinitialpayloaddeletion,itisnoticeablehowaggressiveTRIMis.HowandwhenTRIM
operatesseemstobedependentonseveralfactors.ItappearstheSSDdecidesveryquicklytoerase
cellswhena TRIM commandforthatsectorisissued.Thisdoes nothowevermean thattheTRIM
instructionsarealwaysactedon.
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Althoughthetwosmallerpayloadfileshad100%ofdatarecovered,thelargerfilesreturnedmuch
smalleramountsofdata.Thesmallerfilesaredeletedandextractionisalmostinstantduetothefile
size. The larger files take a longer period of time to perform those tasks and therefore TRIM has
more time to perform its operation before later blocks are extracted. It should be noted that the
largerfileshadonlysmallamountsofdataremaining,butthatdatawaseffectivelythebeginningof
the payload file itself. Again this shows the aggressiveness of TRIM. TRIM can effectively wipe the
remaining data in a matter of seconds thus providing only a small segment of a file as remaining
data.Thisisseenintheresultswhichidentifysmallerfilesthataredeletedandextractedinashorter
period of time compared to larger files where the process is longer with only smaller amounts
remaining.Theresultsafteronehourshowthatanychanceofrecoveringsizeableamountsofdata
in these instances is almost zero. A forensic investigator would therefore have to perform an
extractionveryquicklyaftertheTRIMcommandispassed.Attheinitialpayloaddeletionextraction
mark, the results identify that the garbage collection process has not initiated. Unlike the TRIM
resultswhichshowdatalossimmediately,garbagecollectionisseenasstaticandmakingnoattempt
to"cleanup”anyofthenowapparentlyfreespaceonceoccupiedbythepayloadfiles.

At the one hour extraction mark, the results identify considerable reductions in recoverable data
acrossmostofthescenariosandplatforms.WithTRIMenabled,lessthan0.5%isrecoverableacross
theNTFSandHFS+filesystems.Ext4howeverusesabatchdiscardtodealwithTRIMinstructions.
Larger batches of TRIM ranges are combined and sent to the drive at later intervals. This was
proposedasaperformanceadvantageoversendingTRIMinstructionswitheveryfiledelete(Shimpi,
2009). Batched Discard creates a scenario where even though TRIM is enabled the drive is not
immediatelyawareofthefiledeletionandthereforefreespaceitcanerase.Thiswouldindicatewhy
NTFSandHFS+TRIMenabledfilesystemsappeartodeletemoreaggressivelyintheresults.Itshould
alsobenotedthatthegarbagecollectionprocessactingindependentlyofanyfilesysteminstruction
andlikethatoftheExt4NOTRIMscenario,purgedmoredeleteddatathanExt4withTRIMenabled.
Inmanyaspects,HFS+andNTFSsharesimilaritiesinresults.Ext4,duetothebatchdiscard,resultsin
adifferentoutcome.

Atthefinalextractionmark,allfourTRIMenabledscenariosreturnedbetween0%and0.38%bytes
of data retained for the smallone.small payload file in contrast to the NOTRIM enabled scenarios
which returned values in the region of 0.23% bytes retained to 100%. Using the results of the
smallone.smallpayloadfilehighlightsthedifferencesindataretentionbetweenNTFSwhichappears
tobemorevolatileinitspatterns.

UndertheTRIMenabledscenarioswiththelargeone.largepayload,theendresultidentifieslower
retention of data, primarily leaving only the first few segments of the file. Both idle and activity
scenarioswithTRIMenabledsawthesameresultsintheextentofthedatadeleted.Arguably,HSF+
showedamoreaggressivegarbagecollectionprocessagainstNTFSwhichretained100%ofthefile
with NOTRIM. The random.small payload file results show the size of blocks that TRIM is able to
erase.Thisagainisseenintheresultsfortherandom.largepayloadfilewhichseesbyteretention
degradinginaconsecutivepatternofsize.

TheresultsobtainedduringourAntiForensicstestcaseexperimentsindicatethatTRIMaloneisnot
areliablemeasureforpropersanitizationofaSSD.Therepeatingpatterntestscenarioindicatesa
99.8%zeroingofthedriveusingawholedriveTRIMmethod.Onthe120GBSSDusedforthesetests,
thisisstill185MBto214MBincertaininstances.

Therandomfilleddrivescenarioresultsindicatealoweramountofretaineddataafterawholedrive
TRIMmethod.ItwouldappearthattheSSDcontrollerinourtestdrive,duetodeduplicationand
compressionfeatureshaslikelyplayedapartinthehigherretaineddatafiguresinthetextpattern
scenario. This would lead us to believe that the figures presented are a more accurate
representationofthetrueeffectivenessofTRIMasanAntiForensicsmeasure.Assumingthisisthe
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bestcaseoutcomeforthewholedriveTRIMmethoditisstillnotareliableorrecommendedprocess
forsecurelywipingtheSSD.Westillsee80MBto97MBofdataretainedonour120GBSSD.

CONCLUSION
ThecomparisonofdataretentionacrossTRIMenabledfilesystemshasshownthat,inthecaseof
TRIM,ifTRIMisintendingonperformingaTRIMoperationonmarkedblocks,inamatterofminutes
thatdataispurgedandunrecoverable.Garbagecollection,beingdriveinitiated,isnotasrapidwith
its operation. The garbage collection process operates on its own method, algorithms and time
delay.BothNTFSandHSF+haveshownthisintheirresults.Ext4howeveroperatesuniquelyasto
howandwhentheTRIMcommandissentduetothebatchdiscardimplementation.

The Batch Discard implementation in the Ext4 file system on Linux creates an opportunity for an
improvedchanceofdatarecoverywhencomparedtoNTFSandHFS+filesystemsinaTRIMenabled
setting.Inallthreefilesystemstested,TRIMiscapableofdestroyingdeleteddatawhentheSSDis
sent the TRIM command. In a NOTRIM scenario there is a more aggressive garbage collection
processwhenhighdriveusageanddriveactivityaretakingplaceacrossallthreeplatforms.While
someliteraturehasindicatedthatmanualTRIMtotheentireSSDisaquickandeffectivemeansof
performingantiforensics,theseexperimentshaveshownthatsomeminimaldataisretained.Whilst
thismethodisquick,wesuggesttheuseoftheATASecureErasestandardbuiltintomostSSDs.
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